MERCHANT MARINE SEAMEN AND THEIR IMPACT UPON STRATEGIC SEALIFT
The U.S. Merchant Marine and the entire Marine Transportation System (MTS) is not only vital to our economy, but to our national defense as well. This system has been vital to the sealift operations of the Department of Defense throughout our history and continues to grow in importance. Our need to maintain domestic shipping and an industrial shipbuilding base for national defense purposes must be a priority. The requirement that U.S. flag vessels be U.S.
built, U.S. crewed, and U.S. citizen owned ensures the continuation of a domestic merchant marine and a shipbuilding industry. It also ensures the availability of U.S. vessels and merchant mariners to crew for our Ready Reserve Force and Department of Defense strategic sealift ships in times of national emergency. It is the goal of this system to "be the world's most technologically advanced, safe, secure, efficient, effective, accessible, globally competitive, dynamic and environmentally responsible system for moving goods and people."1 In reality, however, this has not been the result. The main problem with our current system is one of logistics; our marine transportation system is in decline and suffering from a shortage of vessels, and most importantly, qualified, experienced seamen. Today, despite some improvements in recent years, this system has become the Achilles' Heel of our national defense. The United States must make it a priority to rectify this situation before the negative effects of this trend are felt in the context of a national emergency.2
Throughout American history, the U.S. flag fleet-ships built in America, owned by Americans, and crewed by American seafarers-was justly renowned as the nation's vital fourth arm of national defense. Possessing a strong marine transportation system is integral to our national security.3 Though the WWII merchant marines have not received the recognition they deserved, even though they played a tremendous role in winning the Second World War. 4 This was the prime source of wholesale resupply to the theaters of war. Many ships were lost and many men and women sacrificed their lives. This system was also used in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, using left over ships from WWII. No real sealift problems were experienced during the Korean War (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) other than the need to re-mobilize forces so soon after the post-World War II stand-down. During this conflict, some 31.5 million tons of war material were shipped from U. S. ports to Far East destinations. Of this amount, 95 percent were ocean shipments. Eighty percent of the shipments were carried aboard privately owned U.S.-flag vessels, with the remaining 15 percent assigned to Military Sea Transportation ships.
Significantly, all of the vessels involved in this massive, sustained logistical sealift were crewed by civilian American seafarers. About 700 ships were activated from the National Defense foreign-flag ships did not respond to the need to carry cargo to Israel. In fact, the government of Liberia issued a decree specifically prohibiting its flag fleet from participating in the resupply of Israel. These instances raised doubts --How reliable would foreign-flag and the so-called "effective U.S.-control" ships be in the future?
During the next quarter-century, an intermodal "revolution" saw vertical and horizontal integration of rail, truck, and water-borne transportation "modes" and many other dramatic technological innovations generated by the U.S. maritime industry. American carriers pioneered the design, construction, and operation of specialized ships, containerization, double-stack rail cars, specialized containers, electronic equipment identification, satellite tracking and in-transit visibility, and highly integrated, just-in-time, door-to-door services that significantly reduced inventory and warehousing costs for American industry.
Although operational efficiencies were dramatically enhanced and despite the further infusion of shipbuilding funds (as a result of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970), by 1990
American-flag ships carried just four percent of the country's seaborne commercial tonnage.
U.S. ship owners had continued to "flag-out" their ships to take advantage of less onerous tax and regulatory systems and lower crew costs offered by foreign registry. been broken-out and tested, and some had never been operated in the 14 years before the "Storm." Based upon limited pre-war planning, the government estimated that it would take less than a million dollars per ship for a real-world breakout; in reality the average cost was about $1.8 million.
It must be capable of supporting our objectives since the projection of U.S. The current state of our nation's marine transportation system is not one, which could fulfill these needs in time of national emergency.18 The assets of this system are owned, staffed, and managed by many different segments. The commercial sector is owned and operated by many businesses, some registered in the U.S., some in foreign countries. This sector of the marine transportation system has been working with the Department of Transportation, specifically the Maritime Administration to provide for the use of these assets and infrastructure for national security; this relationship will be discussed in more detail later.
The Maritime Administration has also put together the Ready Reserve Force that can be utilized 
The commercial sector is having similar problems. The Vice President of American
Maritime Officers explained that, "unless we take corrective action soon, it will only reach a point from which we will not be able to recover. This has major national security implications because the commercial maritime industry provides the extra mariners needed to activate and crew government-owned sealift ships for military contingency operations."2i Again, because of strong economy, less young people are interested in pursuing the rough life of a mariner.
Commercial mariners can spend anywhere over four months at sea, followed by a couple of months ashore. This short time ashore is taken up with schooling and training. It is also this percentage of seamen that are ashore who would be expected to aid in military sealifts operations. Few families want to be subjected to this lifestyle.26 Young people are less prepared to spend long times away at sea than previous generations. Above all, in the U.S. the major factor has been a great economy.27 Those who are looking for a job, or looking to change jobs, are in short supply. This is causing fierce competition to acquire the best workers.
Additionally, the industry has traditionally recruited for unlicensed labor from the underprivileged population, however, in recent years it has become difficult to find those in this group that can 7 Q pass the required drug tests.
The problem of labor shortages extends beyond the U.S., particularly in Europe.
European shipping experts note that the decline of the last decade in the available number of mariners can also be related to fewer members to recruit from in post-Baby Boomer era. There On the one hand, the share of international oceanborne cargo carried by U.S.-flag vessels has declined despite cargo preference laws because most oceanborne international cargo is not subject to cargo preference laws. In 1992, for example, about 96 percent of oceanborne cargo was carried aboard foreign-flag vessels. On the other hand, these laws appear to have a substantial impact on the U.S. merchant marine industry by providing incentive for vessels to remain in the U.S. fleet. GAO estimates that without preference cargo, the equivalent of up to two-thirds of the 165 U.S. flag vessels engaged in international trade, by tonnage, would leave the fleet. Most of the vessels that would leave would either reflag to another country to save costs or cease to operate if they are not competitive. This would directly affect about 6,000 U.S.
shipboard jobs.
THE COSTS OF CARGO PREFERENCE LAWS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Transporting cargo on U.S. flag vessels is more expensive than doing so on foreign-flag vessels largely because the former are required to be crewed by U.S. mariners, who generally receive higher wages and other benefits and have higher manning-level requirements than comparable foreign-flag vessels. In addition, U.S. flag vessels are generally required to be built and encouraged to be maintained and repaired in U.S. shipyards, which generally charge more than foreign shipyards. These costs are passed on to federal agencies when they use U. One direct effect of this shortage would be decreased productivity of our ports and mobilization assets. On the commercial side, many ports are already feeling this. At the Port of Tacoma, for example, the lack of skilled longshore workers is stressing the capacity of the port and the quality and speed in which they handle ship traffic.34 They are currently processing many fewer ships per day than the nearby port of Seattle. If a similar shortage was suffered during a military conflict, the length of time it would take to get our troops and equipment loaded for departure would be extended. This means taking longer to get our military to the region of conflict.
Such a shortage was significantly felt during operations in Kosovo. Granted, there were other logistical problems in addition to the poor marine transportation system. However, this deficiency led to ammunition shortages and long delays before our forces could get resupplied.35 Both contracting and travel time directly attributed to the delays experienced by our forces in Kosovo.
Taking into account this shortage, could also have important implications on our military strategy in relation to strategic sealifts. It will force the Department of Defense to make an important decision between two strategies. "Decreased flexibility will necessitate more time deployed for amphibious ships or dictate less worldwide coverage or forward deployed logistics bases. These are difficult choices. More time at sea will take its toll on both the ships and its crew, which could negatively impact retention and recruiting efforts as well as maintenance.
Lessening coverage, thereby increasing response time, would be a risk that national policy makers would have a tough time accepting."36
Another important effect this shortage will cause is a higher reliance on foreign-flagged ships. Our military has always taken advantage of the large maritime industries of other nations, especially our close European friends, to supplement our own marine transportation system. However, many of those we traditionally relied on are also experiencing labor shortages. It has been the Far East or third world regions that have been enjoying a surplus of labor in their maritime industries. These nations, with a few exceptions, do not hold tight allegiances to us. They would want to protect access to our markets, however, are less likely to risk heavy losses in order to support our foreign policy. There were many reports during the Gulf War that foreign-flagged ships aided in our sealift operations, refused to pull into some Gulf ports because they felt these areas were not safe.37 This situation has worsened even more program is an excellent start to improving our sealift capabilities, however, it must be just a start.
We could take control of the entire commercial maritime fleet of every shipping company in the nation and it would do us no good if we did not have the qualified seamen to crew the vessels, ports, and other infrastructure. The Department of Defense must make it a priority to reverse the decline in the American shipping industry as well as to recruit and retain a large pool of maritime labor. We are overlooking the largest pool of qualified mariners in the retired Coast There are many problems in our current marine transportation system that the Maritime Administration must address. Although the Maritime Administration has the lead role DOD must be prepared to assume a strong supporting role. However the factor that has the most significant direct effect of our strategic sealift operations is the shortage of qualified manpower.
"As the U.S. relies more on commercial transportation activities to support national security objectives during contingencies, there is vital need to attract and retain a qualified MTS personnel work force. This work force is needed to support all levels of U.S. military mobilization requirements including ship crews, shipyard support for government surge activations, and cargo loading personnel."41 Without our own supply of maritime labor, our sealift capabilities are strained and our national security could be placed at risk.
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